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Oregon v. Elstad: THE CAT IS NOT
OUT OF THE BAG
In an opinion harshly criticized by dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, Justice O'Connor and the Supreme Court have delivered a new approach to the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. Though fairly narrow,
the holding that a subsequent confession
gained after Miranda warnings is valid
even where a previous uncoerced confession was obtained from a suspect absent
Miranda rights discards well-founded doctrines which for years have buttressed the
Miranda rationale. As the dissenters intimate, it is more the reasoning than the actual holding of the Court which fosters a
nervous reaction.
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985),
involved an 18-year-old accused of burglarizing his neighbor's home. After being
contacted by a witness to the burglary,
the sheriff's office dispatched two officers to the home of Michael Elstad with a
warrant for his arrest. Upon arriving at
the home, both officers were escorted to
Elstad's bedroom by his mother. After
dressing, Elstad accompanied them into
the living room, sat down with one of the
officers, and following a brief discussion
of the burglary, confessed to the crime.
His Miranda rights had not been given.
Approximately one hour after reaching
the sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was
given his Miranda rights, which he subsequently waived. He then gave a full statement confessing to the burglary.
The trial court found Elstad guilty of
burglary. On appeal, that decision was
reversed on the grounds that the defendant's inadmissible earlier confession
''tainted'' the later confession which occurred after the defendant was advised of
his Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 61
Ore. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552 (1983). In
the words of the court, "the cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive
impact on [the respondent's] later admission." !d. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of
rights solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary admission without warnings from the defendant.
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor suggests that, "a simple failure to administer
the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability
to exercise his free will" is not enough to
taint a subsequent voluntary and informed
waiver. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1293. The

counter argument to this coercion-based
analysis was espoused in U.S. v. Bayer,
331 U.S. 532 (1947).
After the accused has once let the cat
out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never
thereafter free of the psychological
and practical disadvantages of having
confessed. He can never get the cat
back in the bag, the secret is out for
good. In such a sense, a later confession may always be looked upon as
fruit of the first.
!d. at 540-41.
Until Elstad, the state had the burden of
showing that the lack of a warning did not
taint subsequently obtained evidence. See
Alderman v. United States, 594 U.S. 165
(1969). Elstad changes this and seems to
have placed the burden on the defendant.
Justice Brennan explains, "the Court today appears to adopt a- 'go ahead and try
to prove it' posture toward citizens whose
fifth amendment Miranda rights have been
violated, an attitude that marks a sharp
break from the Court's traditional approach
to official lawlessness." Elstad, 105 S.Ct.
at 1312.
- Tom Swisher

Archer v. Archer: PROFESSIONAL
DEGREE IS NOT MARITAL
PROPERTY
In Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493
A.2d 1074 (1985), the Maryland Court of
Appeals joined a majority of jurisdictions
and held that professional degrees and
licenses earned by a spouse during the
marriage are not marital property and,
therefore, are not subject to a monetary
award. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 8-205 (1984).

The court recognizes a broad definition
of "property," embracing everything which
has exchangeable value or goes to make
up a persons worth. Nevertheless, the
court held a professional degree to be a
mere "expectancy of future enhanced income," "an intellectual attainment," and
not a present property interest.
The parties to the litigation, Jeanne and
Thomas Archer, were married in 1977
after Thomas Archer's first year of medical school. At that time, Jeanne Archer
was pursuing an undergraduate degree
but left school and began to work fulltime. During their marriage, Jeanne
Archer worked and had two children and
Thomas Archer attended medical school.
Thomas Archer received medical school
expenses, a monthly stipend and other
monies from the United States Navy. Citing recent Maryland court decisions, the
court stated that the Family Law Article
requires that non-monetary contributions
should be recognized in determining the
acquisition of marital property. Careful
consideration should be given to both
monetary and non-monetary contribution
by the spouses so that property interests
can be fairly and equitably adjusted.
The appellant, Jeanne Archer, argued
that marital property defined in the Family Law Article as "the property, however
titled, acquired by one or both of the
parties during marriage" should be liberally construed and include medical degrees
or licenses in order to effect the broad
remedial purposes of the Act. However,
the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected
this view.
The court seemed to adopt the reasoning of In re Marriage of Graham, 194
Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which
held that an advanced degree or professional license lacks the traditional attri-
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butes of property. The court further noted
in its opinion that a professional degree,
unlike property, cannot be assigned, transferred, devised, sold, pledged or inherited.
Other arguments supporting the rejection of the appellants proposition included: 1) the too speculative nature of
determining the value of a professional
degree; 2) that an attempt to characterize
spousal contributions as an investment or
commercial enterprise deserving compensation demeaned the concept of marriage;
3) the degree of the spouse is personal and
represents only the potential for future
earnings; and 4) that a graduate degree is
best considered when awarding alimony.
The court rejected the opinion of a minority of jurisdictions which hold that
"the most equitable solution" to compensate one spouse for the sacrifices which
enabled him/her to pursue a professional
degree is to allow the supporting spouse
to "share in the fruits" obtained by the
other spouse.
The court in the past has recognized
that the broad definition of marital property includes pension rights. Deering v.
Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883
(1981). But, the court distinguished a
spouse's property right to pensions from
a professional degree. That is, a pension is
a contractual right to a current asset which
a spouse has a right to receive. However,
such rights are plainly distinguishable
from a professional degree. A professional
degree is an intellectual attainment personal to the holder that cannot be sold,
transferred or inherited. As the court
stated, a degree/license does not have an
exchange value; rather, it represents a potential for "earning capacity made possible ... in combination with innumerable
other factors too uncertain and speculative
to constitute marital property." Archer at
357, 493 A.2d at 1080.
The court concluded by stating that in
its award a chancellor should consider the
circumstances surrounding a spouse's acquisition of a professional degree/license
as well as that spouse's potential income.
Income earned by the acquisition of a
professional degree/license by a spouse
and the sacrifices of the other spouse in
helping to attain such a degree are "factors which may" be considered by the
court in making an alimony award. The
court presumed that the trial court considered these "factors" in determining the
appellant's amount of alimony ($100 per
month not to exceed a year). However,
the court did not consider the adequacy of
this amount since the appellant did not
raise that issue on appeal.
- Gordon Daniels
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Ake v. Oklahoma: PSYCHIATRISTS
IN THE COURT ROOM
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right
to the psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition. In
Ake v. Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 1087 (1985),
the Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, held that indigent defendants do,
under certain circumstances, have a due
process right to the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of their defense.
The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires a state to provide an
indigent defendant with access to "competent psychiatric assistance" to aid in the
preparation of his defense, if the defendant
makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the crime will be a significant factor at trial. Additionally, the
Court in Ake held that an indigent defendant also has the right to a psychiatrist's
assistance at a capital sentencing proceeding if the state presents psychiatric evidence as to his future dangerousness.
The defendant in Ake was charged with
murdering a husband and wife and wounding their two children. At arraignment,
the defendant's behavior was so bizarre
that the trial judge sua sponte ordered him
to be examined by a psychiatrist. The
psychiatrist found that the defendant was
incompetent to stand trial and suggested
that he be committed. Six weeks later,
however, the defendant was found to be
competent provided that he continue to
be sedated with an antipsychotic drug.
When the state resumed proceedings
against the defendant, his attorney, at a
pretrial conference, informed the court
that he would raise an insanity defense.

Therefore, the defense attorney requested
a psychiatric evaluation, at state expense,
to determine the defendant's mental state
at the time of the crime, claiming that the
defendant was entitled to such an evaluation by the United States Constitution. The
state court denied the defendant's request
for such an evaluation. Consequently,
there was no expert testimony for either
side on the issue of the defendant's sanity
at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the defendant's insanity defense
and he was convicted of two counts of
murder in the first degree and two counts
of shooting with intent to kill and was
subsequently sentenced to death.
In determining whether, and under
what circumstances, a state should be required to provide an indigent defendant
with competent psychiatric assistance in
preparing his defense, the Court employed
a three-factor test. The three factors relevant to this determination were (1) "the
private interest that will be affected by
the action of the State", (2) "the governmental interest that will be affected if the
safeguard is to be provided", and (3) "the
probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are
sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided." Ake, 104 S.Ct.
at 1094. The court in Ake, applied this
three factor test, but considered the first
two factors only briefly.
Thus, in considering the first factor,
the court found that the private interest in
the accuracy of a criminal proceeding is
almost uniquely compelling since a criminal proceeding places an individual's life
or liberty at risk. In considering the second factor, the interest of the state, the
court found that a state's interest in denying a defendant a psychiatrist's assistance

